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ARTICLES
OWNING WORDS IN CYBERSPACE: THE ACCIDENTAL
TRADEMARK REGIME

DAVID J. FRANKLYN*

INTRODUCTION

The Internet is facilitating a new attitude toward word ownership
that will spill over into American trademark law and eventually erode its
core conceptual boundaries. This Article argues that the Internet
domain name system is fostering a much more pro-property view of
word ownership than currently exists under trademark law, and that this
new attitude will not be easily quelled. The Internet readily embraces
the idea of language as a commodity. Words on-line are not much
different than pork bellies. Both commodities can be bought, sold,
stored and swapped with ease. The domain name business.com was
recently sold for $7.5 million, wine.com fetched $3 million, and
wallstreet.com $1.03 million.' GreatDomains.com, a popular on-line
auction house, lists thousands of words for sale on its web site and
reports scores of daily transactions.'
None of this is permitted under trademark law. Trademark law
does not permit the sale of words and has historically been relatively
stingy in doling out property rights in words. Trademark law is an
offshoot of tort law, and while it has been expanded beyond its tort law
roots in several important respects, it still retains its basic tort law
character. 3 Trademark law seeks to protect business owners from third
parties who attempt to interfere with established business reputation. 4 It
*
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reading prior drafts of this Article, providing fresh insights, and arguing with me over
its contents, I am especially grateful to J. Thomas McCarthy, Graeme Dinwoodie,
Joshua P. Davis, Frederick Tung, Joshua Rosenberg, and Susan Freiwald. All errors
and omissions, of course, are mine.
1.
Andrew Pollack, What's in a Cybername? $75 Million for the Right
Address, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at C8.
2.

GreatDomains.com, at http://www.greatdomains.com (last visited Apr. 16,

3.

See, e.g., 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
§ 2:14 (4th ed. 1996) (rev. 2001).

2001).
UNFAIR COMPETITION

4.

See id. §§ 2:19-:20.

ON TRADEMARKS AND
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continues to erect substantial barriers to the commodification of
language by withholding exclusion rights until a word is actually used to
sell goods in commerce, 5 by limiting the scope of rights that attach to
trademark ownership, 6 and by imposing restrictions on the alienability of
marks.7 American trademark law is explicitly designed to preclude an
independent "market in marks." Language qua language is not for sale.
To be sure, trademark law even in the off-line world is becoming
more propertized.
By propertized, I mean the tendency of law to
respect an individual's claim that a word is exclusively "hers" in a broad
range of situations and enforce her attempts to transfer her ownership
interest in that word to others as an independent and divisible article of
trade. 8 That courts have expanded exclusivity rights in favor of mark
owners and gradually loosened restrictions on alienation is illustrative of
the fact that trademark law has become increasingly propertized. 9 Thus,
we have seen more expansive approaches to trade address protection
which is illustrated by: a more generous application of the "likelihood of
confusion" test; a proliferation of intent to use trademark applications;
more robust anti-dilution protection; and judicial softening of the
assignment in gross prohibition."
But the domain name system accelerates this propertization process
in much more dramatic ways than courts could ever accomplish under
existing trademark rules. The Internet confers word ownership rights
with abandon. People are able to lock up potentially valuable domain
names for future use with little effort.
For a relatively minor
investment, worldwide exclusivity in an on-line mark can be ensured.
Domain names became such valuable commodities in part because
they are not encumbered by limitations that apply to off-line trademarks.
Unlike trademarks under American law, domain names can be acquired

5.
6.
7.
8.
alienability

See id. §§ 3:3, 16:27-:32.
Id. § 2:14.
Id.
This definition assumes, as have most property theorists, that exclusivity and
are both inherent in the notion of "property." See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL,

PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

218 (W.J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green, & Co.

1909) (1848). But see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987) (arguing that inalienability is not always a necessary component of

property). Whether alienability is a necessary component of property is not the main
issue I address here. Even if one can have property without alienability, it still seems
true to hold that unrestricted alienability facilitates the full commodification of a good.
9.
See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J.
367 (1999).
10. See id. (describing and critiquing the gradual modification of trademark law
from a tort-based system to a more robust property regime).
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There is no use requirement as a
through mere registration."
prerequisite to establishing exclusivity for a domain name. Exclusivity
arises on-line because, for the Internet to function effectively, only one
person can use a given domain name, and as to that name, exclusivity is
absolute.' 2 Trademark exclusivity, by contrast, is always conditional on
a showing of actual use in commerce, and even then extends only so far
as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion, or in some instances, to
prevent dilution of a mark as a selling tool.' 3
Domain names can be sold as independent commodities, whereas
trademarks can be sold only appurtenant to the goodwill they represent.
Generic words-like the word "loans"-are ineligible for trademark
protection; but generic domain names are frequently used as source
indicators on-line with a built-in form of exclusivity."' Domain name
exclusivity, moreover, is international. Trademark rights exist only on
a national basis. The relative ease with which domain names are
acquired, coupled with their unconditional exclusivity and free
alienability, permits the commodification of words on-line in a way that
trademark law historically has not allowed.
As this novel form of word ownership expands, the domain name
system is quickly becoming a rival trademark regime that coexists in an
uneasy tension with traditional trademark law. Each system is affecting
the other as they twist toward the same apparent end: the further
commodification of language.
The domain name system may impact trademark law in two distinct
ways. First, the domain name system, in its robust approach to word
ownership, is putting pressure on the core conceptual boundaries of
trademark law. The domain name system can be seen as a giant petri
dish, an experiment of sorts, in which new life forms are growing. Online structures and practices are creating new norms-new customs-that
may be quite different from the customs that gave rise to trademark law.15
It has been said that law follows custom, not the other way around.
This may be an apt description of the effects of developing cybernorms
on traditional trademark law.
Second, the domain name system may generate a valuable body of
empirical data to evaluate certain critical assumptions that underlie
trademark law. Trademark law has long assumed, for example, that
11. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National)
Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 495, 499 (2000).
12. Id.
13. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:14.
14. See infra Part II.D.
15. On the kinds of normative systems that nourish and are nourished by official
law, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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owning words in gross, separate and apart from the goodwill they
represent, would have anti-competitive effects.
Early cases and
commentators referred to the threat of "trademark monopolies."' 6
Trademark law also refuses to extend exclusionary rights to generic
words for fear that such rights could lead to monopolization of entire
industries.' 7
One continues to see similar anti-commodification
arguments advanced in contemporary trademark scholarship and in
8
judicial opinions.1
It has been difficult to test these claims because there is a lack of
hard empirical evidence, one way or the other, to show the likely effects

of a trademark regime that grants more expansive rights. The Internet
may provide such a body of evidence over time. It permits words to be
owned in gross, to be sold apart from the goodwill they represent, and
to be warehoused for future use. It also permits exclusivity to attach to
generic words. Has free enterprise and fair competition suffered as a
result? The answer may be forthcoming. In the process, the Internet
may demonstrate that trademark law is based on certain assumptions that
are no longer grounded in commercial reality.
But trademark law is also transforming the domain name system.
There are important values embedded in trademark law, and in its

limiting principles, that should be preserved on-line.
16.

See, e.g.,

Trademark law

FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW

RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS

141 (1925) ("The most dire consequences, such as

fraudulent uses and sales of trade-marks and the creation of monopolies, it was
prophesied, must ensue from the recognition of trademarks as property."); see also
Coca-Cola Co. v. J.G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224, 232 (E.D. Ark. 1916) ("The trademark laws, like the patent laws, give the owner a monopoly which neither the Sherman
Act nor any other act of Congress forbids."); EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 57 (1933); RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS 43
(1973); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 55 (1904); Ralph S.
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948);
Lunney, supra note 9, at 373; Sigmund Timberg, Trade-marks, Monopoly, and the
Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 323, 324 (1949).
17. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 12:2 ("To grant an exclusive right
to one firm of use of the generic name of a product would be equivalent to creating a
monopoly in that particular product, something that the trademark laws were never
intended to accomplish."); see also Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked
Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1340-42 (1980).
18. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1714 (1999); Lunney, supra note 9, at 372.
Justice O'Connor recently articulated the anti-property view of trademarks in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989):
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit:
its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.
While that concern may result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in
communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the
protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.
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evolved slowly over a number of years. It attempts to protect business
reputation and to ensure that consumers can adequately distinguish
between different producers' goods in an impersonal, mass-produced
market place. The domain name system, by contrast, is relatively new
on the scene and was originally fashioned as an Internet addressing
system, not as an alternative trademark regime. It became a rival
trademark regime primarily because of the unique structure of on-line
exclusivity and because of the lack of restrictions upon alienability. It
has not had much time to assimilate to traditional trademark values, and
it is not likely to do so on its own. Increasingly, however, the domain
name system is coming under pressure to incorporate values and
limitations embedded in traditional trademark law.
The domain name system presents challenges to trademark law that
are unique-in both kind and degree-and that promise to have long
lasting effects. Because the domain name system is essentially non-legal
in character and international in scope, it is not subject to the dictates of
any particular legal sovereign. 9 Conformity with trademark law is
further frustrated by the fact that the domain name system was initially
developed without any thought of its potential effects on trademark
rights or traditional trademark regimes. All of these factors render it
particularly difficult to control as a cultural force.
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part I
briefly describes the development of trademark law as a property regime
and outlines the property debate as it has unfolded in trademark
scholarship. Part II describes the migration of the domain name system
from a mere addressing mechanism to a shadow trademark system. Part
III discusses five ways in which the domain name system diverges from
traditional trademark law and considers the implications of such
divergence. Part IV considers whether the domain name system is
properly regarded as a property regime at all and examines whether it
will be possible to limit that system's influence on trademark norms.
Part V offers some concluding observations.

19. For interesting discussions of the political legitimacy of the Internet
Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") and issues regarding its
control over the domain name system, see, for example, Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998) and Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet
Coordination: A Domain Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J. 587 (1999) (discussing history
of domain name system and proposals for reform).
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I. TRADEMARK LAW

Trademark law, in the Anglo-American tradition, is an offshoot of
the common law tort of passing off.20 At early common law, cases
emerged in which merchant A sued merchant B for passing off his goods
as those of merchant A. 2' The cause of action might be thought of as a
type of commercial impersonation.22 B pretended he was A to siphon
off A's customers. As a result, A lost sales. At first, courts required A
to show that the impersonation was intentional; that is, that B
intentionally deceived consumers into believing that he was A. 23 Mere
similarity of names or trademarks was not sufficient to create liability.
Moreover, A had to prove he actually lost sales as a result of B's
actions. Thus, like other tort-based causes of action, there were
elements of wrongdoing, causation, and injury. The gist of the action
was that B tortiously interfered with the business relationship between A
and its consumers.
Gradually, courts liberalized the cause of action so that A need not
prove intent. 24 The mental state of the defendant could be difficult to
establish.25 Therefore, courts came to focus on the effects of the
defendant's actions instead.
If they had the effect of deceiving
26
consumers, B could be liable. And over time, the focus on customer
deception, as such, gave way to a focus on customer confusion: courts
required plaintiffs to prove only that consumers were confused about
whether A was the source of B's goods. 27 Indeed, as merchants
clamored for even more protection, courts eased the causation
requirement and permitted a claim where there was merely a likelihood
of consumer confusion as to source.28

20. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:2 ("Beginning in about 1803,
English and American common law slowly developed an offshoot of the tort of fraud and
deceit and called it "'passing off" or "'palming off."').
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, 73, 49 Eng. Reprint 749, 752
(1842) ("A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goods
of another ... ").
23. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 5:2 ("In nineteenth century cases, trademark
infringement embodied much of the elements of fraud and deceit from which trademark
protection developed. That is, the element of fraudulent intent was emphasized over the
objective facts of consumer confusion.").
24. Id. ("By the early twentieth century, the fraudulent aspects of passing off
were gradually deemphasized and emphasis was placed on the effect of confusingly
similar marks on buyers, rather than upon the intent of the infringer.").
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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By and large, relief was still limited to situations where A and B
were competitors. 29 If B was not a competitor of A, one could not
presume damages merely because manufacturers placed similar sounding
or similar looking marks on non-competing products.3" This limitation
also came under pressure. Eventually, merchants pressed courts to
extend the cause of action to defendants who had used confusingly
Courts reacted to this pressure
similar marks in "related" industries.
in different ways. Some readily allowed such suits. 32 Others were more
cautious.

3

In the early 1900s, as the Industrial Revolution was gaining
momentum, some questioned the ability of trademark law to meet
changing commercial realities. Companies like Eastman Kodak could
not be confident that the passing off doctrine would enable them to
prevent others from using the Kodak mark to sell wholly unrelated
goods like bananas or bicycles.34 Indeed, some judges stretched the
passing off concept far beyond its stated boundaries to find alleged
infringers liable.35
By the 1920s, some trademark scholars were arguing that
trademark law was too rooted in its tort law past. 36 They argued that a
more expansive, pro-property approach was needed to protect the
legitimate, investment-backed expectations of merchants. Chief among
the proponents of a pro-property approach was Frank Schechter, a New
York attorney. 37 Schechter argued that the function of a trademark in
the (then) new economy was not so much to indicate where the goods
had come from as it was to create a psychological link between
producers and consumers, and the link is what caused consumers to
purchase the merchants' goods.38

29. Id. ("'Unfair competition' as embodying only 'palming off situations was at
one time argued to be a basis for not enjoining an infringer who used the mark upon
goods not in competition with the prior user."); see also Borden Ice Cream Co. v.
Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912) (finding no infringement of
Borden Milk by Borden Ice Cream).
30. Borden Ice Cream, 201 F. at 515.
31. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:2 (setting forth historical development
of "related goods" doctrine).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV.
L. REv. 813, 825 (1927).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 830-33.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 831.
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Schechter claimed that the mark cemented the link and that it cost
money to create such a linking device.39
He urged courts and
legislatures to recognize this phenomenon and to protect such
investments by treating trademarks as a form of property.4" The basic
idea was that if trademarks were treated more like other forms of
property, their owners could stop a greater variety of trespasses, even
when they could not prevail under the likelihood of confusion doctrine.
Schechter was especially critical of what he saw as judicial overreliance
on the confusion test as an end in itself.41 He did not urge an end to that
test, only that trademark law not be confined by it. 42 Borrowing from
German law, Schechter proposed that well-known or distinctive marks,
in particular, receive protection from the type of harm we now call
"dilution. "43
Schechter's paper provoked mixed reactions. Massachusetts became
the first state to adopt an anti-dilution statute in 1947. Soon other states
followed suit.4 4 These statutes generally permit the owner of a "highly
distinctive" or "famous" mark to prevent it from being used by second
comers in different industries, and on different types of goods, if such
use is likely to injure the first appropriator.4 5 Injury, in this context,
usually consists of showing that the mark has or will lose its selling
power-it will be diminished as an advertising tool due to overcrowding
in the market.46 Alternatively, plaintiffs may recover if another's use of
their mark "tarnishes" their image.47
Despite the adoption of anti-dilution statutes by some states, the
anti-property view remained firmly entrenched. Judges refused to
enforce the new statutes literally, often requiring a showing of consumer
confusion as a predicate to recovery.4 8 In the academic community,
39. Id. at 830-33.
40.

Id.

41.

See id.

42.

See id.

43.

Id.

44.

A list of state anti-dilution statutes can be found in
§ 25 statutory note (1993).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

UNFAIR COMPETITION

45.

(1983).
46.

See, for example, Oregon's anti-dilution statute, OR.

See4

MCCARTHY,

REv. STAT.

§ 647.107

supra note 3, §§ 24:77-:81.

47. Id.
48. For a general discussion of state courts' reluctance to apply state anti-dilution
statutes strictly, see Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationalefor Trademark-Trade
Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 618 (1976). Some
courts continued to require proof of consumer confusion, even though such proof was
not required under the language of the applicable statute. See, e.g., Girl Scouts v.
Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Others held
that the anti-dilution statutes did not apply when the parties were in competition. See,
e.g., Edgewater Beach Apartments Corp. v. Edgewater Beach Mgmt. Co., 299 N.E.2d
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9

By the mid-

1950s, a spirited debate was under way. Schechter, and others,
continued to push for a more expansive approach to trademark
protection.5 0 Their main point was that marks functioned in new ways
and that trademark holders' investments deserved enhanced protection."
In response, other commentators contended that trademark law was
not a property regime in the true sense of that term, and that it should
not be pushed in that direction. 2 One concern was that expansive
trademark rights could lead to monopolies or otherwise make it difficult

for new companies to enter markets where existing firms had very
strong marks. 3 Another concern was that aggressive trademark
protection reinforced manufacturers' abilities to manipulate consumer
behavior. 4
When consumers buy goods primarily because of a
trademark (and not because of product quality), they may act irrationally
and in a manner that rewards clever advertisers instead of quality

manufacturers. 5

It is one thing for advertisers in a free country to

stimulate such irrational associations; it is another thing for the law to

protect and encourage such behavior.
In the midst of this debate, the United States Congress adopted the
Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute. 6 The Lanham Act provides

for the registration of trademarks but specifically declines to grant

548, 554 (I11.
App. Ct. 1973). For a comprehensive treatment of the dilution cause of
action at the state level, see Howard J. Shire, Dilution Versus Deception-Are the State
Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative to the Law of Infringement?, 77

49.

REP. 273 (1987).
See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 9, at 368-69.

50.

See, e.g., Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50

TRADEMARK

MICH. L.REV. 967 (1952).

51.
52.

See id.
See, e.g., George E. Middleton, Some Reflections on Dilution, 42
TRADEMARK REP. 175, 178-79 (1952). The author stated:

The trade-mark owner complaining of dilution, like the dress designed [sic]
deploring the copyist, isseeking some means for protecting property in an

idea embodied in a catchy word, an original design; but under our
Constitution this can be done, if at all, only by invoking the patent or
copyright laws .... [Tirade-mark rights have nothing to do with property

in ideas.
Id.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 1168-69 (arguing that strong trademark
protection for the persuasive or advertising functions of marks would be anti-

competitive).
55. See id.
56. The current version of the Lanham Act iscodified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
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exclusionary rights based on registration alone.57 Instead, it hews
closely to the old common law rule that only use creates trademark

rights.58 Registration confers a variety of benefits on the registrant and
serves mainly as a way to notify the national population of who claims
rights in a particular mark. 9
Since the Lanham Act's passage, changing commercial realities and
new cultural attitudes have led to other expansions of trademark law:

enlargement of the trade-dress concept; revision of the Lanham Act to
extend liability to situations where consumers are confused not only as
to the manufacturing source of goods, but also to situations where they
perceive a possible affiliation or sponsorship relationship between
similarly-branded goods; and a general judicial willingness to find
defendants liable whenever they believe defendants are "free-riding" or
"poaching" on plaintiffs' goodwill, even if the elements of plaintiffs'
case have not been clearly established.6"
This gradual expansion of rights in favor of mark holders, or, at a
minimum, the perception that such an expansion has occurred, has been
referred to as the "propertization" of trademark law.61
It has
engendered much recent scholarly comment, and, again, we see the
argument that trademark law should return, as much as possible, to its
tort law roots. 62 These scholars argue that the recent expansions are too
one-sided in favor of trademark holders and too insensitive to the need
for a robust public domain. Echoing the mid-century anti-monopoly
57. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J.
759, 776 (1990)
[T]he Lanham Act was purportedly designed to do on a national level no
more than the common law already did on the local level. So if the Senate
Report is to be believed, the original idea was to do little more than create
for registrants a Federal action for passing off.
Id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 16:1 ("Apart from the concept of a
constructive use, it is not registration, but only actual use of a designation as a mark that
creates rights and priority over others.").
58. See Carter, supra note 57, at 777 (noting that the Lanham Act adopts an
approach which "keeps Federal trademark law on the passing-off model: rights flow
from the investment, the use in trade, that creates common law ownership"); see also 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 16:1 ("The United States, unlike many Civil Law nations,
has a rule of priority that is based on first-to-use, not first-to-register.").
59. With the adoption of the intent-to-use provisions in 1988, federal registration
may provide more than mere notice. It effectively permits the registrant to warehouse a
mark for future use while establishing a particular product line. See 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, §§ 16:16-:17; see also Carter, supra note 57, at 778-81 (discussing
theoretical problems with the intent-to-use option).
60. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 9, at 373-444.
61. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 18, at 1693-94; see also Radin & Wagner,
supra note 19, at 1305 n.29.
62. See Lunney, supra note 9; see also Lemley, supra note 18.
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concern, the claim has been raised, once again, that liberal trademark
rights will lead to "trademark monopolies" and enable merchants to
stifle competition. 6 On this view, a property-like approach to word
ownership is dangerous to a free-market economy .64 A serious attempt

has been made to show that these dangers are real and substantial, and
that they are playing out in various strands of trademark law. 65
The anti-property view is not limited to scholarly comment.

continues to surface in judicial decisions.

It

One continues to see

statements in judicial opinions to the effect that the primary purpose of

trademark law is to protect consumers from source-confusion, and not to
award property rights in words.66 Any property rights created in words
as a result of trademark law is incidental and unintended, on this view.67

These decisions repeat the argument that a more pro-property approach
to mark ownership is inconsistent with the rationales that underlie
trademark law and with the balance struck by Congress when it drafted
the Lanham Act.68
Few recent scholars have defended the pro-property approach or
the perceived expansion of rights in favor of mark holders.69 One
wonders why such a defense has not been more forthcoming. It is not
immediately clear that the propertization process is necessarily a
negative development. Indeed, one could make a fairly compelling
argument that a more liberal attitude toward language ownership fuels

investment.7"

When words are ownable and become articles of

63. Lemley, supra note 18; Lunney, supra note 9.
64. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 9.
65. See id.; see also Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws
Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269
(1985); Lemley, supra note 18; Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
433 (1994).

66.

See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157 ("While [trademark law] may result

in the creation of 'quasi-property rights' in communicative symbols, the focus is on the
protection of consumers, not the protection of producers as an incentive to product
innovation. ").
67. Id.; see also Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) ("A trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is
necessary to prevent customer confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate
differentiation of the trademark owner's goods."); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v.
Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding "property" in a
trademark is defined by likelihood of confusion only).
68. See cases cited supra notes 66-67.
69. There has been some defense of federal anti-dilution protection specifically.
See, e.g., Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
108 (1993); see also Kimbley L. Muller, A Position of Advocacy in Support of Adoption
of a Preemptive FederalAntidilution Statute, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 175 (1993).
70. Private property, it has been argued, enables owners to exploit the full value
of their individual investments, and thereby "encourag[es] everyone to put time and
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commerce, there is more commerce. More commerce may mean more
wealth for everyone. Indeed, the commodification of language could be
viewed as but a subset of a larger cultural phenomenon: the
We might think of it as the
commodification of everything."
acceleration of privatization generally. 2 People seem to like to own
things.
Language is no exception. Why should such ownership
impulses be stifled absent clear proof of injury to the social fabric?73
One could also argue that a more property-oriented approach to
trademark law could provide us with firmer conceptual boundaries.
Much of trademark law is indeterminate.74 The likelihood of confusion
test and the anti-dilution doctrines are highly fluid concepts that yield
unpredictable results. 75 One need only look at the line of cases dealing

with the "related goods" doctrine to see just how inconsistent trademark
law can be.76

Perhaps less reliance on tort-like concepts, and more

labor into the development of resources." Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 28-29 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that private property is an inducement to good management and the
development of resources). For an older statement on the benefits of commodification,
see 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *15 (endorsing "that wise and orderly
maxim, of assigning to every thing capable of ownership a legal and determinate
owner").
71. For a provocative discussion of "universal commodification," see Radin,
supra note 8, at 1859.
72. See id.
73. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE
WATERS AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 17 (1826) (arguing that all things
capable of ownership should be assigned an owner, with those things incapable of
exclusive ownership being assigned to the sovereign). A modern statement of this idea
can be found in Bruce Yandle, Resource Economics: A Property Rights Perspective, 5
J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1 (1983) (citing the natural progression toward individual
ownership of even scarce resources). For a contrary view, arguing that private property
should not be presumed to be the most efficient or socially desirable form of resource
management, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract
Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980).
74. For an interesting analysis of indeterminacy in trademark law, see generally
Carter, supra note 57 (arguing that the lack of clear and consistent conceptual
boundaries in trademark law enables trademark owners to sell what does not exist).
75. For a comprehensive overview of the ambiguities inherent in the likelihood
of confusion test, see, for example, Michael J. Allen, Who Must Be Confused and
When?: The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under Federal Trademark Law, 81
TRADEMARK REP. 209 (1991).
For criticisms of the dilution cause of action, see, for
example, Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark
Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122 (1993). See also Port, supra note 65.
76. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:61-:62 (citing contradictory
examples of instances where goods were found to be related or unrelated).
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explicit reliance on a property scheme, would lead to more stable
boundaries and greater predictability in this area of law.77
My point here is not necessarily to defend the new propertization of
words-either in real space or in cyberspace. Rather, I wish to show
how the Internet domain name system operates as a sort of foil to test
the assumptions that underlie the anti-property view. Propertization is
much more robust on-line than off. Words are clearly articles of
commerce on the Internet in ways that far exceed developments in real
space. The Internet thus furnishes us with a mechanism to evaluate
whether the commodification of language is a bad thing. It may help us
consider whether such developments have produced, or are likely to
produce, the type of anti-competitive consequences some have feared.
II. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM

Domain names originally were conceived as on-line addresses, that
is, as a technological means by which one computer could locate another
computer on the worldwide web.7 8 They continue to perform that
function. Every domain name has three parts . 79 The component at the
end of the name (which might be thought of as a suffix) consists of
either a generic top-level domain name ("TLD") or a country code." °
Currently there are eight generic TLDs (.com, .edu, .net, .org, .gov,
.mil, .int, and .arpa)." l The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN") has indicated its intent to add seven more
TLDs in the near future. 82 The proposed new names are: .aero, .biz,
.coop, .info, .museum, .name, and .pro. 3 Additionally, every country

77.

Of course, in some situations, unclear boundaries may be preferable to clear
See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOzo L.
REv. 121 (1999).
78. For a discussion of the history of the domain name system and proposals for

boundaries.

reform, see generally Liu, supra note 19. ICANN's role in setting domain name policy
is discussed at length in A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using
ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000).
79. For a description of the top-level domain structure, see Memorandum from
Jon Postel, USC/Information Sciences Institute, to the Internet Community, Request for
Comments: 1591: Domain Name System Structure and Delegation 1 (March 1994), at
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfcl591.txt.

80. See Froomkin, supra note 78, at 40.
81. Id. (noting that only three of the generic TLDs are open to anyone who is
willing to pay the registration fee (.com, .net, and .org); the remaining generic TLDs
are restricted on various grounds); see also http://www.icann.org (last visited Sept. 20,
2001).
82. http://www.icann.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
83. Id.
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has a country code, such as .uk for the United Kingdom or .us for the
United States .84 There are 244 two-letter country code TLDs.85
Every domain name also has a second-level component that appears
immediately to the left of the top-level component.8 6 Second-level
components vary considerably, but can be no longer than twenty-two
digits and cannot be the same as any other name that currently is
registered within a particular TLD or country code. Within each toplevel domain name, there can be only one second-level name. This
"rule" is merely the logical result of a naming system that requires
unique names to function properly: if there were two identical secondlevel names within any top-level domain, computers would not know
where to send information. 7
Accreditation of domain name registrars is performed by ICANN.88
ICANN is a private, not-for-profit entity."
It is not an official
government agency. ICANN subcontracts out domain name registration
responsibility to various independent registrars. 90 Different registrars
handle the registration of domain names within the generic TLDs and
within the various country codes. Registrars contractually agree with
ICANN to follow ICANN's policies and procedures and to abide by its
uniform dispute resolution policy. 9 '
Domain names are registered on a first-come, first-served basis.9"
The only screening process, during the initial application phase, is
whether the name has already been registered in that particular
domain.93 If it has been registered, it is deemed ineligible for further
registration.94
Domain names are not allocated by national
governments.
The domain name system began as a mere on-line addressing
mechanism, so that computers could locate each other on the worldwide
web. Domain names could have been purely numeric, in which case
84. Froomkin, supra note 78, at 39-40.
85. Id. (noting that there is some controversy over the fact that not every country
has sovereignty over the TLD associated with its territory).
86. Id. at 39.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 70-82.
See Management of! Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741

(June 10, 1998). But see Froomkin, supra note 78, at 70 (arguing that ICANN, while
technically private, is beholden to, and controlled by, the United States Department of
Commerce in a number of respects).
90. See Memorandum from Jon Postel, supra note 79, at 2.
91. Froomkin, supra note 78, at 25.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95.

See Liu, supra note 19, at 593.
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there would have been little potential for conflict with trademark law.
But it was determined early on that alphabetical names were easier to
remember.96
In part because domain names permit the use of alphabetical
components, it quickly became much more than a mere addressing
mechanism.
Beginning in the 1990s, merchants began to see its
potential as a commercial naming system akin to, but in some ways
more potent than, traditional trademark regimes. Particularly within the
lucrative dot-com realm, domain names became potentially valuable
source locators for on-line goods or services.97 An easily-remembered
domain name held advantages similar to easily-remembered trademarks.
One might say that domain names became trademarks-plus. A
domain name could be registered as a trademark and acquire the full
panoply of rights that registration confers. But it could also acquire
another, distinct set of rights that arise by virtue of the structure of the
domain name system and the lack of legal rules limiting domain name
ownership, arbitrage, or usage.
Domain names differ from trademarks in several ways, which,
when taken together, make them exceedingly valuable commodities-in
some instances more valuable than regular trademarks. Under the
domain name system, word rights are acquired through the simple act of
registration. This is different than American trademark law, where legal
exclusivity is acquired only through actual use of the mark in commerce.
Once a person registers a domain name, she acquires a type of
exclusivity that in some senses is stronger than trademark exclusivity.
Domain name exclusivity arises because only one person can own and
use a particular domain name.
This simple fact has far-reaching consequences. It ensures its
owner, wholly apart from law, an absolute right in a piece of language.
Trademark law never grants such rights. Unlike trademarks, domain
names can be owned "in gross"; that is, as things in and of themselves.
Trademarks, by contrast, can only be owned in connection with a going
concern, and when trademarks are assigned, the goodwill attached to
them must travel with the mark. This represents a substantial restraint
on alienation that does not constrict domain name transfers. The result
has been the creation of an independent market in language that could
not exist under American trademark law.
Domain names also acquire the same bundle of rights regardless of
whether they incorporate generic, common descriptive, or invented
words. This too is different than trademark law. Generic words cannot
be trademarks at all off-line, common descriptive words get relatively
96.
97.

Froomkin, supra note 78, at 38.
See id. at 59-60.
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weak protection, and invented words are singled out for favored
treatment.9 8 None of these distinctions apply to domain names.
Finally, domain names quickly became attractive as commercial
identifiers because they are global in scope. Only one person in the
world can own a given domain name. Trademark rights, by contrast,
are only national in scope. Multiple persons can own exactly the same
trademark in different countries without obtaining permission from the
first user. The possibility of attaining broad exclusivity rights with few
restraints on alienation combined to make domain names especially
attractive pieces of on-line property.
III. POINTS OF DIVERGENCE
In this section, I explore how various aspects of the domain name
system facilitated the commodification of language on-line and how such
commodification may impact the conceptual boundaries of trademark
law. In partitular, I focus on (a) differences in the mode in which
property rights are acquired; (b) the scope of exclusivity that each
system affords; (c) divergent approaches to alienability rights; (d) how
the systems differ in regard to descriptive and generic words; and (e) the
geographic scope of rights. At each juncture, I consider how such
differences might impact trademark regimes in the future and,
conversely, how the domain name system may come under increasing
pressure to conform to trademark law.
A. Acquisition Rights
American trademark law has long followed the principle that one
cannot acquire exclusive rights in a word or other symbol until one
actually uses it in trade. 99 The idea is that one only "owns" the right to
use the word as a link to the goodwill one has developed in an on-going
concern." ° Until there is use, there is no goodwill to protect and no
concern about consumer confusion. Under American trademark law,
98. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir.
1976). For a comprehensive overview of the distinctiveness spectrum in trademark law,
see2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 11:1-:91.
99. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 16:1 ("The way to obtain rights in a
business symbol is to actually use it as a mark. ").
100. See, for example, Justice Pitney's famous comment in Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916):
Common-law trade-marks, and the right to their exclusive use, are of course
to be classed among property rights . .. but only in the sense that a man's
right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good-will
that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others, is a
property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an instrumentality.
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one cannot own a word in gross, i.e., as a thing separate and apart from
the goodwill it represents. 10
Use thus acts as a sort of conceptual boundary, a way to mark off
and limit what one owns and what one does not. The common law rule
might be stated as follows: one only owns a mark insofar as one has
actually used it in connection with a certain line of goods and in a
certain geographical area.' 0 2 Such use does not create absolute property
rights in the word at issue. One only "owns" the right to exclude
confusingly similar uses of the mark by others.' 3
For example, assume company X uses the word LION to sell bed
sheets in New York and does not register the mark on the federal
trademark registry. X owns the LION mark only in connection with
sheets, only in the New York region, and even then only to the extent
necessary to prevent consumer confusion. If a competitor can think of a
way to distinguish its use of LION or some similar mark from company
X's use of the same mark, company X will not be able to prevent the
competitor's use of that mark. Relying solely on the likelihood of
confusion test, X will not be able to stop a different company from using
the word LION as a mark for wholly unrelated goods, such as bicycles
(putting aside for the moment the anti-dilution statutes). Thus, under
common law principles, X's ownership interest in the word LION is
quite limited; it is limited both by geographic and product markets. Use
defines the scope of rights.
The use boundary is firmly established in American trademark law
and affects many trademark doctrines. To be sure, the use boundary has
been eroded in many respects that have nothing to do with domain
names. 104 The nationwide priority right created by the registration
system and the 1988 intent-to-use provisions have eroded the boundary
to a certain extent.0 5 And dilution law has gone even further in granting
trademark owners rights to exclude unrelated goods-i.e., one can

101. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:14 ("[B]ecause they are merely symbols of
good will, trademarks must be transferred very carefully, lest the symbol and its good

will go separate ways.").
102. The common law rule has been modified somewhat by the 1988 intent-to-use
provisions, which permit a registrant to reserve a mark for potential use (for a limited
period of time) even though she has not yet used it in commerce. However, even under
this provision, use is ultimately required. If such use is perfected within the allowable

time frame, her use date relates back to the earlier date on which she filed her intent-touse application. See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 16:15-: 18 (describing the
intent-to-use application and the effects of constructive use priority).
103. See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:14 ("[T]he 'property'
trademark is the right to prevent confusion.").

104. See generally Carter, supra note 57.
105. See id.

in a
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prevent uses of famous marks even in product markets where one has
not used a given symbol as a mark.' 06
But the domain name registration system presents a unique challenge
to the use boundary. A measure of exclusivity exists on-line as soon as
one registers a domain name. At that point in time, the registrant is the
only person who can use that exact domain name as an on-line address
or trademark. The scope of exclusivity that attaches will be discussed
more fully below. But the point to observe here is that under the
domain name system, the act of registration, not use, creates
exclusionary rights. This is squarely at odds with American trademark
law, where use, not registration, creates exclusive property interests.
Is this a conflict? One could say it is not, because the limited rights
that arise by virtue of domain name registration are not the same as
trademark rights. They are two different types of exclusivity rights
operating in different spheres. For example, a domain name owner
cannot prevent non-identical uses of its domain name on-line without
relying on trademark law. The exclusivity that exists merely by virtue
of the domain name system is limited and qualitatively different from the
type of exclusivity that exists under trademark law. Domain name
exclusivity only applies to the domain name qua domain name, whereas
trademark exclusivity applies to the domain names qua trademark.
Once a domain name is actually used in commerce as a source identifier,
it should be subject to the same legal restraints that apply to off-line
marks, including the limitations on use and alienation. Thus, one might
contend that we should not be too worried about the different manner in
which on-line exclusivity is acquired.
While these arguments have some intuitive appeal, they ultimately
fail to account for the complexities of the situation. Registration as a
divergent mode of rights acquisition is significant in two respects. First,
domain names cannot be kept entirely separate from trademarks. It is
true that a domain name does not become a trademark under the
American system until it is used in commerce to identify goods. But
domain names can be registered with the intent to use them as
trademarks and warehoused for future use. In this pre-use period,
traditional trademark restrictions do not apply, because they are not yet
trademarks. Thus, they can be warehoused or sold in gross (i.e., as
divisible commodities). And by their mere registration, they prevent
trademark use by others. One might think of domain names during the
106. Cf. Lemley, supra note 18, at 1698 (noting that "[t]he most obvious example
of doctrinal creep in trademark law is dilution"). But see Lunney, supra note 9, at 408
(arguing that prior to the widespread adoption of anti-dilution statutes, the likelihood of
confusion standard had already expanded to cover many of the injuries dilution law
sought to redress).
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pre-use period as "trademarks-in-waiting." During this period of time,
they are essentially trademarks, and yet they evade trademark law. The
mere fact that on-line trademarks can be reserved and stored in this
manner means that the use boundary has already been eroded for such
pre-mark marks.
Second, domain name exclusionary rights are still exclusionary
rights, and domain name registration confers its own bundle of powerful
property interests. From the merchant's point of view, domain name
exclusivity confers benefits wholly apart from trademark rights. This
may be why some on-line owners and users of generic domain names
are not terribly concerned about their inability to register their domain
names as marks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
Even if such domain names are not considered
("USPTO").
trademarks, the merchant still obtains the right to exclude all uses of the
same domain name-as a domain name-on-line. The domain name
system thus confers its own type of trademark right through the mere act
of domain name registration.
Whether these developments will eventually undermine the use
boundary off-line, or will in any respect pressure the United States to
adopt a first-to-file system, is difficult to predict. But it is clear that the
on-line merchant enjoys certain advantages in reserving trademarks for
potential use that the off-line merchant does not.
B. Exclusionary Rights
A second major area of difference is the scope of exclusivity that
exists by virtue of trademark law and the scope of exclusivity that arises
through the domain name system. Domain names acquire exclusivity in
two distinct ways. First, they have a measure of exclusivity by virtue of
the fact that only one person can own a given domain name. This type
of exclusivity approaches an absolute right in a piece of language; it is
narrowly confined to the exact domain name at issue, but as to that
domain name, it is a very strong form of exclusive right. I shall call
this bundle of rights "computer-generated exclusivity."
Second, when domain names function as trademarks, they can also
acquire the full bundle of exclusivity rights embedded in standard
trademark law. Domain names do not always function as trademarks.
Some function merely as on-line addresses. But, generally speaking,
whenever a domain name is understood by the ordinary person to be the
name for a source of goods, it is functioning as a trademark.
Computer-generated exclusivity is both deeper and narrower than
the exclusivity afforded by trademark law. It is narrower, because it
extends only to the exact domain name at issue. The domain name
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owner must resort to trademark law to stop others from using similar,
but not exact, replicas of its name, and to stop unfair acts off-line.
But within its sphere, this computer-generated exclusivity is much
deeper and more absolute than the exclusivity offered by trademark law.
As stated above, in a certain sense, the domain name holder owns what
amounts to a fee simple absolute in a piece of language. Only one
person in the entire world can use that piece of language to buy or sell
goods on-line. It is much stronger than the typical trademark type of
exclusivity, which, under American law, extends only to the use of the
same or similar mark on the same or similar goods and even then can be
invoked only to the extent necessary to prevent consumer confusion.
There is no on-line limit or boundary regarding the type of goods or
services that may be used in connection with one's mark. Nor can
others use that same mark to sell different types of goods or services,
even where such concurrent use clearly would not harm the first user.
For example, only one person can own united.com. By being first to
register that domain name, an owner can effectively prevent others from
using that exact address as a trademark with regard to all types of goods
or services on-line.
This is a form of protection that is even broader than dilution law,
which enables a trademark owner to extend her monopoly to different
types of goods, but still requires proof that the defendant's use of the
plaintiff's mark diminishes the selling power of the mark or tarnishes
plaintiff's image." °7 The domain name right is much simpler and
broader than this. It is unconditional and not in any way tied to a
showing of harm. In this sense, it more closely resembles property
rights in other contexts and is quite different from the tort-based
protection one receives through trademark law.
Again one has to ask whether there is a conflict here. Why should
on-line merchants obtain a type of right that off-line merchants may not?
Will this computer-generated exclusivity ultimately make us more
receptive to expansions of trademark rights off-line, to the further
propertization of American trademark law? Does the absolutism of the
domain name system threaten important values that underlie the more
cautious and limited approach reflected in traditional trademark law?
Perhaps these questions can be put in a slightly more accessible
context with a hypothetical. Assume American trademark law was
changed such that only one person or company could have a trademark
right in the word UNITED or AMERICAN or AMAZON or CHERRY,
and that this right was absolute; that is, it extended across all geographic

107. See supra Part I (discussing evolution of dilution law); see also 4
MCCARTHY,

supra note 3, §§ 24:68-:69.
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and product boundaries and in no way depended on a showing of likely
consumer confusion or dilution. 108
Would this be bad? In some ways it might be better than the current
trademark system, which allows concurrent use of the same word as a
mark for different types of goods. Because such concurrent use is
allowed, mushy line-drawing becomes necessary as goods get more
related. The likelihood of confusion test is not a model of clarity or
predictability.'0 9 And while one might be able to resort to dilution
protection to prevent uses of famous marks in non-related markets,
dilution is also a very vague doctrine. "0 It has saddled trademark law
with problems. A bright-line rule declaring that only one entity or
person could own a given word as a mark might be refreshingly clear
compared with the indeterminacy of trademark law.
But if this is so, why has trademark law so steadfastly refused to
grant such absolute rights in words? Perhaps one concern is that such
an approach would lead to language depletion-if words could be fenced
off in such absolute and sweeping ways, there might not be enough
words left over for others to use to name their goods."' One can almost
hear the echo of Locke and his admonition that "first to grab" is only a
justification for exclusivity when one leaves "enough and as good" for
others."12 Is the domain name system sufficiently flexible to ensure that
second-comers have "good enough" language to identify and address
their on-line stores?
Perhaps the reluctance of trademark law to dispense any absolute
exclusionary rights in words is based on a common-sense recognition
that such rights would be unnecessary and thus wasteful in the off-line
world. There is no need to permit only one company to trademark the
word LION if others can also use it without detriment to consumers.
The law wisely chooses to be cautious in doling out rights when it does
not have to do so and when there may be negative consequences.
If caution is the rationale for trademark law, one could argue this
value should also be recognized on-line. The domain name system is a
108. Authors Radin and Wagner refer to the growing pressure to grant trademark
protection to particular words in all product categories as the "decompartmentalization"
of trademark law. Radin & Wagner, supra note 19, at 1304-05. And they refer to the
pressure to grant trademark protection on a global scale as the "unterritorialization" of
trademark law. Id.
109. Allen, supra note 75.
110. Port, supra note 65, at 435.
111. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 57, at 774-75 (arguing that while there may be
an infinite number of words or combinations thereof for use as potential trademarks, in
practice many merchants prefer suggestive marks because they describe a product and
emphasize its favorable qualities; and suggestive marks may be limited in supply).
112. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 20-21 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690).
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human construct. The scarcity it creates can be uncreated. One simply
has to redesign the system, or so it would seem. ICANN recently
decided to add several new TLDs, apparently in an attempt to relieve
perceived congestion within existing domains. Whether this step will be
effective remains to be seen. But ICANN does not write on a blank
slate. The cyberworld cannot be completely re-made at this point in
time.
Vested interests have arisen; consumer attitudes have been
shaped. For at least the foreseeable future, the dot-com realm in
particular will have special cachet that will be difficult to overcome.
Perhaps the reluctance of trademark law to grant absolute property
rights in words is not based on profound philosophical concerns, but
rather is a by-product of history, an outgrowth of the fact that trademark
law sprung up as an off-shoot of tort law, not property law." 3 Whatever
the reason, the refusal to grant any unconditional rights in words is
deeply embedded in trademark law and seems to be squarely at odds
with the domain name system.
C. Alienability Rights
Let us now turn to alienability rights. In this section, I will first
describe the ways in which trademark law has liberalized its approach to
mark alienability, and then I will discuss the ways in which the domain
name system may further accelerate this process.
Finally, I will
consider whether the fluidity of on-line language swapping threatens to
undermine important values trademark law seeks to preserve in the offline world.
1. TRADEMARK LAW'S ALIENABILITY RULES

Under American trademark law, marks in real space are owned only
appurtenant to an on-going business and to the goodwill that that mark
represents." 4 Goodwill here may be defined roughly as the expectation
of repeat patronage from one's customers." 5 For this reason, one
113. Schechter, supra note 34, at 819-20 (discussing historical roots of trademark
law).

114. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:15 ("A trademark is a very peculiar kind of
property.

For it has no existence apart from the good will of the product or service it

symbolizes."); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97
(1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant
to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is employed.").
115. For an early definition of goodwill in English law, see Broad v. Jollyfe, 79
Eng. Rep. 509 (1620). See also EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL TRADE-MARKS AND
UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914) (defining goodwill as the favorable consideration shown by
the purchasing public to goods known to emanate from a particular source). According
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cannot assign a trademark to another unless one also transfers the
goodwill it signifies." 6 An attempt to assign a mark without also
transferring its goodwill is considered an assignment in gross and is null
and void." 7 It passes nothing. This rule is based on the use boundary.
One cannot sell what one does not own. One only owns the mark
insofar as one has used it and developed some level of goodwill in it.
To be sure, the assignment in gross prohibition has weakened over
the years."' At early common law, one could not sell a trademark
unless one also transferred the actual physical assets of the business in
which it was used." 9 This rule was designed to ensure that the
assignor's goodwill (customers) went with the mark to the assignee. 2 '
It effectively prevented the assignor from easily remaining in the same
business and retaining his existing customers.' 2 ' Retaining customers
was cheating because one only owned the mark insofar as it created a
link to the expectation of repeat patronage; the retention of customers
meant one had sold one's mark in gross. And this, of course, was a
violation of the use boundary.
Eventually, however, courts relaxed this rule, by redefining what it
meant to transfer goodwill. No longer was it necessary to sell the
physical assets of a going concern.' 22 Goodwill would be deemed to
pass as long as there was some risk one's customers would travel with
the mark.2 3 And this risk could be presumed to exist if the assignee
used the mark to sell the same type of goods that the assignor sold-and
did so in the same geographical area. " In this way, assignment rules
were softened to allow the assignor to stay in business, albeit under a
different name, while still enabling him to sell his trademark if he so
desired.
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to Lord Eldon, goodwill is "the probability that the old customers will resort to the old
place." Bell v. Ellis, 33 Cal. 620, 625 (1867).
116. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 18:1-:9; see also Metro. Bank v. St. Louis
Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893) ("[Goodwill] is tangible only as an incident, as
connected with a going concern or business having locality or name, and is not
susceptible of being disposed of independently.").
117. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 18:3.
118. Carter, supra note 57, at785-87; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §
18:2.
119. See generally Lunney, supra note 9, at 410-16 (providing historical account
of how the common law rule gradually softened).
120. Id. at 410.
121. Id. at410-11.
122. Id. at 412-13.
123. Id. at 414-15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 416.
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Off-line alienability restrictions were further relaxed as trademark
licensing rules changed.
Trademark licensing may be defined as
permitting another entity to use one's mark temporarily for a fee by way
of a contractual relationship.' 26 Initially, courts were quite resistant to
the idea of trademark licensing.1 27 There was a fear that consumers
would assume the licensed goods were manufactured by the licensorthe trademark owner-and not by the licensee. Consumers could thus
be defrauded into buying inferior goods. 2 '
But this fear too gave way to a more fluid approach to word
ownership, as merchants called for greater flexibility in the use of their
marks. With the rise of the Industrial Revolution, and the proliferation
of different types of goods made under the same mark, it made sense to
have a legal system that permitted trademark licensing. The rules were
changed to meet new commercial realities. Under the modern approach,
licensing is allowed if the licensor controls the quality of the licensee's
goods. 29 This rule is designed to ensure that consumers are not fooled
into buying goods of inferior quality.
The new approach to trademark licensing enables merchants to
avoid many of the difficulties of the assignment in gross prohibition.
Businesses can now license their marks to manufacturers in unrelated
fields (often called "collateral licensing"), 3 ° even though they could not
assign their marks to merchants in such fields. As long as they exercise
some form of quality control, such collateral market licensing is
permitted.'
The availability of collateral licensing takes much of the
bite out of the assignment in gross rule.
2. LANGUAGE ARBITRAGE ON-LINE
While trademark law has expanded to meet merchants' demands for
a more fluid word ownership system, it does not come close to offering
the type of flexibility that exists on-line. The domain name system
sidesteps the assignment in gross prohibition altogether.
One can
register a domain name, intending to use it as one's on-line trademark,
save it for future use, and in the meantime sell it to someone else.
126. See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort
Liability for Trademark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (1998) (defining
trademark
127.
128.
129.

licensing).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.

130. Id.; see also Robert C. Denicola, InstitutionalPublicity Rights: An Analysis
of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984)
(discussing consistency of collateral licensing with classical trademark theory).
131. Franklyn, supra note 126, at 9.
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Hoarding is allowed. There are no time limits on warehousing; no
requirement of use; no prohibitions on transfer or licensing. Market
forces determine the value of a word. Law is not interposed as a barrier
on alienability rights or practices.
This fluidity of language acquisition and transfer has created an
independent language market in cyberspace. Words are bought and sold
for huge sums of money. Business.com, loans.com, and other common
descriptive domain names have sold for millions of dollars each.13
Domain names can be purchased either directly from registrars, where
the fee to register is nominal, from other domain name owners, or from
independent word warehouses, where they are more likely to fetch
larger sums. Entire web sites exist for the sole purpose of facilitating
on-line word auctions.' 33
There is evidence that people like the new system of word
ownership. Several web sites exist for the sole purpose of facilitating
on-line auctions of domain names. Moreover, in the late 1990s, generic
domain names fetched the highest prices.' 34 Apparently investors
believe that such words will make superior on-line trademarks, or they
think other people will assume they do and thus pay larger sums for
such words. Whatever the reasons might be for the interest in domain
name ownership, it is clear that people have readily embraced the notion
of words as freely exchangeable commodities.
These on-line developments are instructive, in part, because they
show what happens when legal restraints on alienation are lifted.
Domain names easily become subjects of property.
As on-line
commercial identifiers, they have obvious value. It is only natural that
persons would see them as potential bundles of profit in a free market
system.
Their potential has been enhanced as e-commerce has
flourished. With the addition of yet more TLDs, merchants will
continue to be attracted to the potential rewards of warehousing easilyremembered and catchy business names for future use in the cyber
marketplace.
How will on-line alienability practices affect traditional trademark
law? Of course, answering such a question calls for speculation, and it
is difficult to predict what may occur. But several possible effects seem
worth noting. First, as language becomes more fluidly exchanged in
cyberspace, people may become more accustomed to the notion that one
132. Pollack, supra note 1. See generally GreatDomains.com, at http://www.
greatdomains.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2001).
133. See, e.g., GreatDomains.com, at http://www.greatdomains.com (last visited
Apr. 16, 2001).
134. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce:
Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks-The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic
Domain Names Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 938-40, 947-58 (2001).
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can own a word, and this attitude may spill over into traditional
trademark law. The culture is being desensitized to word ownership
taboos.
The fluid approach to on-line language swapping could eventually
displace past attitudes that saw such arbitrage as a threat to competitive
balance. It could further reduce the force of the assignment in gross
doctrine in standard trademark law. Judges who apply trademark
doctrines could be influenced by the new cultural attitudes toward word
alienation as they are expressed on-line. This new attitude may lessen
the vigilance with which they apply traditional doctrines. Given the
malleability of those doctrines, it would not be difficult for judges to
find a transfer of goodwill even if one does not actually exist.
Second, on-line language practices could affect the coherence of
trademark law. Trademark law hangs together as a coherent body of
legal doctrine only to the extent it adheres to the use boundary. The
assignment in gross prohibition reinforces the use boundary. There is
no doubt that the use boundary has already been eroded as the
assignment rules have been relaxed, even in the off-line world. A
further erosion of that boundary-due to cultural acceptance of a
division between owning words and owning the goodwill they
represent-may result in further incoherence in trademark law.
Third, on-line practices could also push American trademark law
into conformity with the trademark laws of other countries, where marks
can be assigned apart from the goodwill they represent. " As the world
shrinks, the Internet could become a catalyst for American trademark
law to come into harmony with the approach to trademark alienability
that exists in most other countries.
Finally, alienability practices in cyberspace may provide us with a
body of evidence to evaluate the validity of the rationales that underlie
the assignment in gross prohibition. The assignment rules in trademark
law were adopted to prevent what has been called a "market in marks"
and the warehousing of language. Clearly we see such warehousing online. All of this is quite inconsistent with the philosophy underlying the
assignment in gross prohibition. Indeed, the legislative history of the
Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, evidences a strong
Congressional intent to avoid establishing a trademark system that
facilitated a "market in marks. " 136 Presumably, the fear was that if
language became detached from goodwill, such a market could occur,
135. Most other countries allow trademarks to be assigned in gross. See, e.g., 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 18:10 ("[T]he majority rule worldwide is that trademarks
may be assigned without associated good will.").
136. Carter, supra note 57, at 779 (noting a similar congressional sentiment prior
to the adoption of the 1988 intent-to-use provisions).
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with all sorts of untoward consequences: speculation in words,
warehousing of words, and unnecessary costs ultimately shifted to
consumers.
Some of these consequences are materializing on-line. People do
speculate in words, and they store words for future use. There are two
different types of possible harm associated with such practices. One
possible harm is the act of speculation itself. The legislative history of
the Lanham Act seems to reflect a legislative sense that speculation in
words was an unseemly thing.' 37 Words are uniquely our common
heritage. They are little packets of meaning, constantly in flux, that we
all make. To say that one word belongs to one person is an affront to
the commonality of production and maintenance that language
necessarily entails. And language cannot really be objectified. Unlike a
particular parcel of land, to which one can point, language exists only in
our collective consciousness. Its boundaries are not easily marked off.
It is an ephemeral thing. 38 To permit ownership of it, in the full-blown
property sense, seems a bit artificial. And to allow people to speculate
in language-to swap it as freely as pork bellies-seems to cheapen it.
Another possible harm is scarcity. Warehousing words creates
artificial scarcity. In the off-line world, multiple persons can use the
same word to sell different types of goods or to sell the same type of
product in different geographical areas. Such concurrent use rights
ensure that there is enough language to go around. While language
seems to be infinite (and it may be as a matter of theory), as a practical
matter some words may function more easily as trademarks and thus be
more desirable to would-be appropriators.' 3 9
One reason a particular word makes a good trademark is because it
is easy to remember. In the parlance of trademark law, we call these
words inherently distinctive. Fanciful and arbitrary marks exhibit this
characteristic. They encode themselves into our minds in ways that
stick. One remembers the word KODAK for cameras, for example.
137. Id.
138. This thought was put nicely by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: "A word
is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
139. Some market research indicates, for example, that suggestive marks
frequently make superior selling tools, because they simultaneously describe a product
and relate some positive feature concerning it. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 57, at 76972. Perhaps for this reason, Proctor & Gamble selected the mark "SWIFFER" as its
trademark for a "swifter sweeper." The closer the mark is to the product name, the less
money producers need to spend to invest the mark with meaning as a memorable product
link. But there are a limited number of suggestive marks to go with any particular
product. In this context, language depletion may occur. Second-comers may be forced
to spend more money to invest non-suggestive language with advertising significance.
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There seems to be a great variety of words, or word combinations, that
could achieve this type of association.
Other words are easy to recall because they parallel or evoke the
generic name of a product. SWIFFER, for example, is the trademark
for a new static-free mop marketed by Proctor & Gamble. It suggests
"swifter" and "sweeper" and thereby lodges in the human memory
bank. Proctor & Gamble chose it for this purpose. Loans.com also fits
into this category. Both words are memorable because they suggest a
relationship with the generic category of thing they describe.
As domain names are appropriated, there may be fewer memorable
ones left over for everyone else. Indeed, given that only one person can
use a given word or phrase as her domain name within a given realm,
such as the dot-com realm, there is an artificial scarcity built into the
domain name system. This fact, coupled with the fact that one can
warehouse as many words as one desires for as long as one desires,
certainly seems to drive up the potential for language hoarding.
Whether creating new top-level domains can cure such hoarding remains
to be seen. It is clear, however, that ICANN is concerned about current
levels of congestion and language depletion that exist on-line,
particularly within the coveted dot-com realm.
D. Levels of Protection
Trademark law provides different levels of protection depending on
the type of word one seeks to appropriate. Judge Friendly laid out the
relevant categories in his famous Abercrombie decision.14
Made-up
words, like "KODAK" as a mark for cameras, receive heightened
protection, whereas common descriptive words, like "TASTEE" as a
mark for salad dressing, receive very limited protection."' Descriptive
words must acquire "secondary meaning" as trademarks before they can
be registered or protected under trademark law.' 42 A descriptive word
acquires secondary meaning as a trademark, when, through advertising,
a substantial segment of consumers see the word primarily as a mark in
the context in which it is used.'43 Generic words are completely
ineligible for trademark rights. In the off-line world, for example, the
word "wine" cannot be a trademark for use in connection with the sale
of wine. It is considered a generic word, a word that names the class of
things it sells, and is thus off-limits for private appropriation.

140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:2.
Id.
Id.
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The domain name system, by contrast, offers the same level of
protection to all domain names, regardless of the type of word at issue.
Fanciful terms are treated just like descriptive and generic words. All
acquire the same bundle of computer-generated rights. One result of
this cyber free-for-all is that generic domain names, such as wine.com
And they are increasingly used in their
are springing up everywhere.'
generic sense, i.e., wine.com is used to sell wine on-line. The USPTO
has taken the position that such domain names cannot be registered as
trademarks.' 45 But that has not stopped them from being used as
trademarks on-line. Nor has it prevented their owners from enjoying
the type of exclusivity that the domain name system provides.
One reason generic words cannot be owned in real space is because
trademark law attempts to drive mark appropriators toward the selection
of distinct marks for their businesses. Thus, arbitrary and fanciful
marks are considered the strongest and eligible for the highest levels of
protection. So long as marks are unusual and distinct, consumers are
more apt to keep them separate. And this enables the trademark system
to perform one of its central purposes: clear delineation of different
manufacturers in an impersonal, mass-produced world.
It is not clear that trademark law truly achieves this objective;
indeed, even in the off-line world there may be powerful economic
incentives for merchants to choose descriptive or suggestive words as
their trademarks.' 46 But the law nevertheless continues to try to drive
merchants in a different direction-toward the distinctive.
Generic domain names may threaten this objective. When the genus
is ownable, and when it is perceived as a valuable mark/domain name
on-line, others are likely to choose marks that are similar to the genus.
And thus there is a proliferation of indistinct and highly similar marks
around the genus. A quick check on-line reveals a clustering around
most generic words. For example, in addition to wine.com, word
speculators have already registered mywine.com, ourwine.com,
winestore.com, and twenty-five other variations of the generic root word
"wine.""'

To be sure, would-be domain name owners may steer away from
generic domain names because their status as trademarks in real space is
in question, or, more importantly, because they may be too indistinct to
144. See Nguyen, supra note 134, at 947-58.
145. See OFFICE OF ASSISTANT COMM'R FOR TRADEMARKS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF

COMMERCE, EXAMINATION GUIDE No. 2-99: MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART,

OF DOMAIN NAMES (1999), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/
guide299.htm.
146. Carter, supra note 57, at 769-71 (explaining why merchants may choose
suggestive marks for business reasons).
147. Register.com, at http://www.register.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2001).
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differentiate one's business, given the likely proliferation of other
similar domain names. But against these downsides, merchants might
weigh the possible advantages that come from linking one's domain
name as closely as possible to the genus of goods one wants to sell. As
we have already seen, generic domain names may be easier for
consumers to remember. And some search engines may push generic
domain names to the top of the list when consumers conduct on-line
inquiries. Apparently, these possible advantages lead some merchants to
choose generic domain names despite countervailing concerns.
But are consumers served by such developments? Are they
consistent with the purposes and objectives of a rational trademark
system? Are they consistent with the objectives of the trademark system
we have? These are difficult questions to answer. In the long run, the
lack of any system for doling out different levels of protection for
domain names may lead to an abundance of common words used as online marks. And if this occurs, the on-line naming system may make it
difficult for consumers to differentiate between producers. 48
'
We will have to see whether this occurs.
As noted above,
commercial realities may force merchants to choose highly distinctive
domain names as on-line marks. And this, in turn, may show that a
legal regime offering different levels of protection was not needed after
all. It may turn out that the Abercrombie continuum was not bad, just
unnecessary-at least insofar as it functions as an incentive to choose
distinctive words as trademarks.
E. The GeographicScope of Rights
A fundamental feature of trademark rights is that they exist only on
a country-by-country basis. 49
' The general rule is that different people
in different countries can own exactly the same word as a mark for use
on identical types of goods. 50 Smith can have trademark rights in the
word LEAP for woman's clothing in the United States, whereas Jones
can own that word in the United Kingdom for the same goods. There

148. Crowding may be
generally, it has been noted
sufficient degree of territorial
"stay away," and one must

disadvantageous for other reasons. In property theory
that property regimes depend, in many contexts, on a
distinction. One must be able to say "this is mine" and
be able to enforce such territorial claims. See, e.g.,
RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 65-76 (1999) (noting that territorial
possessiveness is instinctual in most animals, including humans).
149. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 29:1.
150. Id.
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are important exceptions 5and limitations to this rule, but they need not
detain us at this moment.1 1
The Internet takes a different path. Domain names are global. The
computer-generated exclusivity one acquires in a domain name is
universal. Only one person in the world can own the domain name
amazon.com and use it as his trademark on-line. It is, in a sense, a oneworld mark. Again, the exclusivity I refer to exists not by virtue of
law, but by virtue of the fact that only one person can own a given
domain name in the entire world.
Indeed, one could view the domain name registration system as a
type of universal, worldwide trademark registration protocol for on-line
marks. To be sure, the rights acquired are limited and subject to attack
under the trademark laws of any country where the on-line mark is
"'
used. 52
Thus, rights may be contingent (in this sense) and remain in
flux for some time. But surely the lure of such worldwide rights,
combined with the fact that they span all product markets, has fueled the
robust public interest in warehousing and trading domain names.
IV. ARE DOMAIN NAME RIGHTS PROPERTY RIGHTS?
Throughout the discussion thus far, I have assumed that domain
names are a form of property, and that the domain name system can
properly be characterized as a property regime. I have compared
trademarks to domain names by conceptualizing both systems in explicit
property terminology-i.e., discussing them in terms of acquisition,
exclusionary, and alienability rights. One could argue, however, that
domain names are not truly property and that the rights they confer
should not be compared with other property interests. If so, it might be
erroneous to view domain name developments as spurring the
"propertization" of language.
There is some truth to that argument. Property in other contexts is
backed by legal sanction. On one level, domain names do not fit that
mold.
Indeed, I have acknowledged that the computer-generated
exclusivity that the domain name system facilitates is different than legal
exclusivity.
Much of what I have talked about arises from the
technological accident that only one person can register and use a given
domain name.
Domain name rights might, on this view, be
characterized as a set of emerging cultural norms.
Customs and
151. Famous marks may be recognized in foreign countries pursuant to various
international treaties.
Id. § 29:61 (discussing the "famous marks" doctrine in
international trademark law).
152. For an excellent discussion on the relationship between domain names and
the territoriality principle, see generally Dinwoodie, supra note 11.
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practices are developing on-line that resemble property transfers, but
until they are legally enforced, it would be inaccurate to refer to this
process as the propertization of language.
And yet, on another level, that is exactly what is occurring. While
domain name exclusivity may not arise by virtue of law, it will
ultimately acquire legal grounding. 5 3 As domain name owners swap
their interests in on-line auctions, traditional contract law will be called

on to enforce these deals. In this manner, computer-generated rights
will be transformed into property rights.
Moreover, it is difficult to say that something that sells for $7
million is not property. The combination of alienability and exclusivity
rights (however those exclusivity rights are initially acquired) is the

hallmark of property interests in other contexts. " In this instance, law
and custom merge. Whether one characterizes on-line practices as
extra-legal norms, as pre-legal custom, or law as structure, it is difficult
not to see the emerging system as a property regime. To be sure, it is a
privately administered property regime, but it is a property regime
nonetheless.

On another level, it could be argued that even if domain names are
a form of property, they do not pose unique challenges to trademark
law. In particular, one might point to 1-800 numbers as an example of
how trademark law ultimately accommodated-and controlled-a novel
and technologically created form of exclusivity.' 5 5
There are important parallels between domain names and telephone

numbers. Each system operates as a locator mechanism, a way to find a
particular entity. Domain names are used to locate computers on the
Internet; telephone numbers are used to locate entities on the telephone
system. Occasionally, people obtain alphabetic telephone numbers, such
as 1-800-FLOWERS, and use them not merely as telephone numbers,
153. In the bankruptcy context in particular, courts have arrived at contradictory
conclusions regarding whether domain names are "property." Some courts have held
that they are, and thus are subject to attachment by creditors; other courts have held that
domain names are property rights of the registrar which are leased or contracted to the
registrant domain holder. For an excellent survey of the cases and a discussion of the
issues involved, see Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying,
Securing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 255 (2000).
154. There is a venerable tradition in property theory supporting the notion that
exclusivity and alienability are both necessary components of property. See, e.g., MILL,
supra note 8, at 218. But see Radin, supra note 8 (arguing that inalienability is not a
necessary component of property).
155. See, e.g., J. Theodore Smith, Note, "1-800-Ripoffs.com": Internet Domain
Names are Telephone Numbers of Cyberspace, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169 (arguing that
"trademark law established for mnemonic telephone numbers should be applied to
domain names").
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but also as trademarks. The telephone number becomes, in essence, the
brand name.
The USPTO takes the position that such telephone
numbers can be registered as trademarks and protected as such, but only
if they function as source indicators and otherwise satisfy normal
trademark requirements.' 56 In making such determinations, the PTO
drops the 1-800 part of the name on the ground that it adds nothing to
the meaning of the phrase as a mark.' 57 Under this approach, 1-800FLOWERS, for example, would not be eligible for trademark
registration because it is a generic term for flowers.
It could be argued that domain names are not much different than
telephone numbers that function as trademarks-that trademark law has
fashioned sufficient rules for dealing with telephone numbers, and that it
should have similar success with domain names. On this view, domain
names are no more likely to erode the conceptual boundaries of
trademark law than telephone numbers are.' 58
The analogy between domain names and telephone numbers has
much to commend it. Both are locator systems. Both systems confer a
measure of exclusivity due to the fact that only one person is assigned a
particular telephone number or domain name. And telephone numbers,
like domain names, are capable of functioning as trademarks. Indeed,
in each area, consumers have shown a propensity to try to register
generic numbers or addresses as trademarks with the USPTO.' 59
But there are important differences between domain names and
telephone numbers. The key difference is that no one sells telephone
numbers. They have not become independent articles of commerce.
There is no market in telephone numbers. If one wishes to obtain a
special telephone number, one has to apply to the relevant service
provider for that number. If it has already been taken, there is no other
recourse. One cannot simply buy the number from another user. They

156. See

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE GUIDELINE

("TMEP")

§ 1209.01(b)(12) (regarding marks comprised in part of "1-800" or other telephone
numbers).
157. See id.; see also USPTO EXAMINATION GUIDE No. 2-99, supra note 145
(noting that adding a 1-800 or www. prefix or a .com suffix to a generic word does not
make it eligible for trademark registration).
158. For an illuminating comparison of telephone numbers and domain names,
see Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 66 (1995), at http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/
vlil/burk.html (arguing that disputes involving domain names that also function as

trademarks "need not be divorced from the law of real space ... and precedent such as
the telephone mnemonic cases will continue to be helpful, so long as it is realized that, at
some point, the correspondence between telephone numbers and IP addresses will break
down").

159. See id. 1 57-59.
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are thus not "property," if, as is commonly recognized, an essential
element of property is alienability.' 60
Domain names, by contrast, can be bought and sold on the
secondary market. ICANN, the entity that runs the domain name
system, has not prevented down-stream alienability, 6 ' and no separate
feature of law prevents it either. As a result, investors have quickly
latched onto the property potential of domain names. They have
realized that they could reserve one for a small fee and then sell it (or
technically, sub-license it) to others for much more. This is how
domain names such as loans.com, business.com, and wine.com all
fetched such high prices on the secondary market.' 62
Moreover, domain names are much more important than telephone
numbers as potential source indicators. One thinks of cyberspace as a
separate realm and e-commerce as a separate market. One does not
think of the telephone system as a separate market. The telephone can
be used to participate in real space markets. But there is no such thing
as "tele-space." When consumers use the Internet, domain names play
a vital role in linking producers, products, and purchasers.
They
perform a source-identifying function that is far greater than any sourceidentifying role previously played by alphabetic telephone numbers.
It is possible that the function of domain names will decrease over
time as new top level domains are added, and on-line consumers rely
more on search engines and less on their memory of particular domain
names to find useful products on the Internet.1 63 ICANN has indicated it
will add seven new top-level domains in the near future. "6 And there is
nothing to stop it from enlarging the number of names even further as
time goes on.
Some search engines prioritize listings based on how much a
particular merchant paid to be included in the relevant directory, not
based on whether the search engine's domain name corresponds to the
160. E.g., MILL, supra note 8, at 218.
161. It is not altogether clear why ICANN has not prevented downstream
alienability. It would appear that ICANN could do so if it so desired. If ICANN were
to prevent alienability, domain names would lose much of their allure as independent
commodities.
162. Pollack, supra note 1.
163. Radin & Wagner, supra note 19, at 1303 (arguing that it is likely domain
names will become less valuable due to the addition of new TLDs, the formation of
competitors to NSI, and/or the emergence of "sophisticated search engines, 'smart
browsers,' agent applications, or other technological innovations"); see also Dan L.
Burk, Trademark Doctrinesfor Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 698
(1998) (arguing that domain names will "likely lose much of their value as access to
online resources becomes increasingly transparent to the user [through search
engines]").
164. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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searcher's request. When these types of searches are conducted, a
domain name is less significant and thus may be viewed as less valuable
from a property point of view. If domain names diminish in value for
any of these reasons, they may pose less of a threat to traditional
trademark regimes.
But domain names should not be discounted yet. The addition of
new top-level domains may reduce the value of existing domain names,
such as those that exist in the popular dot-com realm, but the aggregate
interest in domain names may increase as people seek to secure rights in
the new TLDs. Some people will rush to register existing domain
names within the new TLDs, and others will try to exploit opportunities
for domain name ownership they perhaps missed the first time around.
Moreover, several search engines still employ, in whole or in part,
search techniques that are keyed to domain names. More -importantly,
domain names will continue to be marketed as brand names. To take a
particularly well-known example, Amazon.com is both an on-line
address and a famous brand. Search engine approaches are not likely to
diminish its value or to make it less desirable (or profitable) to turn
other domain names into brands. Domain names naturally perform
source-identifying functions. It is likely they will continue to do so.
And it is likely that merchants will continue to exploit their potential.
Thus far in this section, I have argued that domain names are
property, that they pose a significant and unique challenge to trademark
law, and that they are likely to remain important in the future. If these
predictions bear out, the prime difficulty will be in keeping domain
name rights separate from trademark rights. On one level, the matter
should be simple. Computer-generated exclusivity, while absolute, is
narrow. Amazon.com owns only amazon.com; if it wishes to prevent
someone from selling books at amazons.com, it must turn to trademark
law. Moreover, the moment a particular domain name is used as a
trademark, it should be subject to same limitations that apply to other
trademarks, i.e., the assignment in gross prohibition, the generic word
doctrine, the likelihood of confusion test, and the limited availability of
dilution protection. In this way, it should be possible to keep the two
systems fairly separate and minimize the influence of domain names on
trademark law.
But in other contexts, things may get more muddled. 65 Property
interests in domain names qua domain names cannot always be kept
165. To take a fanciful example, suppose A owns book.con as a domain name
and never uses it to sell books. B then starts an off-line store called book.com and has
no equivalent domain name. She simply likes the name and hopes that the owner of the
equivalent domain name does not use it to sell books on-line. Could A stop B from
operating her store? Technically, the answer should be no, since A owns only the
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separate from trademark interests in domain names. Consider, for
example, the situation that exists when a domain name is first acquired
but is not yet used as a trademark. One is tempted to say that in this
primal state, the domain name is only a domain name, and the mere fact
that it can be warehoused or sold in gross is not particularly troubling,
since one is warehousing or selling only the domain name qua domain
name, not the domain name qua trademark.
The problem with this view, however, is that even in this primal
state, the domain name is a potential trademark. Indeed, the only
reason domain names command such high prices on the secondary
market is because of their potential utility as on-line (and off-line)
trademarks. It thus cannot be gainsaid that the domain name system
does, in fact, facilitate trademark arbitrage in ways that simply would
not be allowed off-line. Nor can one be sure that such practices will not
affect the ways in which trademarks are hoarded and transferred for offline use. For example, if one wishes to warehouse "loans.biz" as a
potential trademark for use primarily in the off-line world, one need
only register it as a domain name. This should have the same practical
effect as registering it as a trademark. The only difference is that the
166
domain name registration can never be cancelled for non-use.
Spillover is likely to occur in other ways. As we have seen,
generic words are completely ineligible for trademark protection in the
off-line world. If the generic word doctrine were applied rigorously to
generic domain names that are used as on-line trademarks, they should
be deemed similarly ineligible for trademark protection. Thus, when the
owner of "loans.com" sues the owner of "loan.com" for trademark
infringement, a court should dismiss the suit on the ground that the
former has no trademark rights against the latter. But this is not
occurring. Already, there is evidence that some judges are allowing
such suits to proceed, apparently on the ground that relief may be
necessary to prevent consumer confusion. 67 It will not always be
domain name and has not used it as a trademark. In such circumstances, she has no
trademark rights and thus no legal basis for enjoining B. However, one can imagine,
perhaps sometime down the road, a judge accepting the argument that there is a property
interest in the domain name qua domain name, wholly apart from trademark law, which
gives A relief as against B. As domain names are used more frequently as trademarks
on-line and on bricks-and-mortar stores, such an argument becomes more credible.
Surely the person who paid $7.5 million for the domain name business.com would assert
such an argument if another entity tried to use that domain name as a trademark off-line.
166. Dinwoodie, supra note 11, at 501.
167. In a recent case in San Francisco, for example, a federal district court
refused to dismiss a trademark infringement claim brought by the owner of e-cards.com
against the owner of ecards.com. E-cards v. King, Civ. File No. 99-3726SC (N.D. Cal.
filed 1999). Plaintiff was the first entity to sell greeting cards on-line under the ecards.com name. It alleged that defendant's use of ecards.com to sell similar products
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possible to draw a tight boundary between domain names in their
capacity as on-line addresses and domain names in their capacity as online trademarks. 6 ' And because of this difficulty, domain names that
function as trademarks will escape several restrictions that apply to
trademarks in the off-line world.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have examined whether the domain name system is
nurturing a pro-property attitude toward language ownership that will
ultimately spill over into American trademark law and reshape its core
boundaries. I have argued that the domain name system is a property
system that competes with trademark law and that it facilitates the
commodification of words in ways that trademark law would not allow.
One might say that the domain name system celebrates word ownership,
while trademark law grudgingly marches in that direction.
One's attitude toward these developments might have something to
do with how one feels about the idea of owning language. Indeed, it
might be surprising to some that words can be owned at all. Words are
not like tangible things, which often have clear boundaries. Words are
incorporeal; they act as verbal symbols for packets of meaning. One
cannot easily identify where one word stops and another begins.
Moreover, language is essentially a shared activity. It happens only
between people and is inherently communal. The social aspect of
language insures that it is constantly in flux. Words change their
meanings, and these meanings exist only in the collective consciousness
of a particular language group at a particular point in time.
Because of these factors, we might be reluctant to allow people to
"own" words. We might be inclined to say that words are not the sort
of thing that can be cabined off for purely private use. Or we might say
that they are not the type of thing that should be cabined off. Allowing
people to own words has its costs. If words could be fully owned, their
owners could charge all others rent for use. Conversation might become
on-line was confusingly similar and thus infringed the e-card.com trademark. Defendant
argued that plaintiffs mark was generic and thus ineligible for trademark protection.
The court rejected this claim and permitted the case to proceed. A jury awarded $4.5
million in favor of the plaintiff. Ultimately, the case was settled in 2001 without a
reported opinion.
168. The use of generic domain names presents a number of issues, which
arediscussed more fully elsewhere.
See, e.g., DAVID J. FRANKLYN, TRADEMARK
PROTECTION FOR GENERIC DOMAIN NAMES

(manuscript on file with author); See also

Sarah E. Akhtar and Robert C. Cumbow, Why Domain Names Are Not Generic: An
Analysis of Why Domain Names Incorportating Generic Terms Are Entitled To
Trademark Protection, 1 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 226 (2000).
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expensive. There might be a lot less of it. Or people might simply
make up new words to avoid paying rent for use of privately owned
words.
Despite these objections to commodifying language, words
increasingly are the subject of property rights.
Developments in
trademark law and in the domain name system both reflect a similar
cultural phenomenon: the growing desire of people to own words and
the legal system's growing solicitude of that desire.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau said long ago the only reason mankind has
been cursed with the institution of private property is because once upon
a time someone erected a fence around a tract of land and said it was
his, and his fellow human beings were foolish enough to respect his
claim. 6 9 Today, the same could be said of domain names. People are
erecting fences around words on-line and gaining the exclusive rights to
use those words as commercial identifiers in cyberspace. They are
purporting to buy and sell these words as if they were, in fact, articles
of private property. In this sense, every domain name owner is a cyber
squatter. And, as was true in Rousseau's mythological early society,
other people, and courts of law, increasingly are respecting the fences.
Such fence erecting, and fence respecting, is not likely to abate.
There seems to be something natural about owning words. People like
it. It holds the potential for vast profit. ICANN can modify the
architecture of the domain name system, for example, by creating still
more top-level domains. But given the vested interests that have already
arisen and the worldwide reliance on the system in its current
configuration, these modifications probably will not be too substantial.
Domain name ownership probably will continue to be characterized by
easy acquisition rules, a broad form of computer-generated exclusivity,
and a robust secondary market in the transfer of rights. And domain
name owners will press in every instance for broader property rightsboth on-line and off. In short, the domain name system, qua property
regime, is here to stay.

169. See 3 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, in
THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF ROUSSEAU 43 (Roger D. Masters & Christopher Kelly
eds., Judith R. Bush et al. trans., Univ. Press of New Eng. 1992) (1754). Rousseau put
the point in more florid language:
The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his
head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was

the true founder of civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what
miseries and horrors would the human Race have been spared by someone
who, uprooting the stakes or filling in the ditch, had shouted to his fellows:
Beware of listening to this imposter; you are lost if you forget that the fruits
belong to all and the Earth to no one!
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In the meantime, trademark law will continue to be challenged by
the new style of word ownership that the domain name system offers.
Trademark law may bend to meet new commercial realities and new
cultural attitudes toward word appropriation. Such bending would seem
particularly likely to occur with respect to the availability of registration
as a mode of rights acquisition, the registerability of generic domain
names as trademarks, and the gradual whittling away of the assignment
in gross prohibition. Whether trademark law will soften its edges in
these areas explicitly, as a matter of legislative act, or more gradually,
as a matter of judicial decision, remains to be seen. But it seems
reasonable to assume that domain name ownership will accelerate the
propertization of language that is already occurring off-line.
Trademark law will also change the domain name system. This is
already occurring. Indeed, one can see the push to apply trademark law
more thoroughly to domain names in ICANN's mandatory dispute
resolution system, 7 ' in new anti-cybersquatting legislation (at both state
and federal levels),' 71 and in the application of dilution law to alleged
cybersquatters. 72 Some have even called for the creation of some type
of worldwide agency to perform a pre-screening process similar to the
process performed by the USPTO.' 73 In the meantime, courts continue
to apply the trademark laws of their home countries to disputes between
trademark holders and domain name owners.
American trademark law and the worldwide domain name system
seem destined to coexist in a sort of uneasy dialectical relationship. At
some level, each system challenges the fundamental assumptions, and
core boundaries, of the other. Each will bend to meet the other, but the
two systems cannot be completely reconciled. The domain name system
in particular seems poised to accelerate the propertization of language in
ways that will reshape and transform traditional trademark regimes.

170. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 11, at 510-13 (discussing ICANN's
mandatory dispute resolution rules and their potential impact on trademark law).
171. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)
(Supp. V 2000); see also Gregory B. Blasbalg, Masters of Their Domains: Trademark
Holders Now Have New Ways to Control Their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 ROGER
WILLIAMS U L. REV. 563 (1999) (describing new federal anticybersquatting
legislation).
172. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:69.1 (discussing application of dilution
law to cybersquatters).
173. Dinwoodie, supra note 11, at 515 (considering pros and cons of worldwide
trademark register, for certain types of marks, in relation to the domain name system).
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